|
|
Reasons
behind the Finnish “Continuation War” 1941
- 1944:
Sami Korhonen
(Finland) Webmaster of “The Battles
of Winter War”
www.winterwar.com
1. Winter
War 1939 - 1940 and the Moscow Peace Treaty
1940
The Finnish
foreign policy during the 1920s and 30s,
and the unyielding stand in the negotiations
with the Soviet Union in Fall 1939 led
to the Finnish-Soviet Winter War (November
30th 1939 - March 13th 1940). The Soviet
Union had demanded large areas from the
Karelian Isthmus in order to “secure” Leningrad
against any attacks. Finland didn’t
want to follow the road, that the Baltic
States had taken, and decided to deny the
Soviet demands.
The Red
Army was expecting a quick victory, but
Finland fought against the unjustified
attack with unexpected ferocity, scoring
huge victories in Ladoga Karelia and northern
Finland. The Soviet drive in the Karelian
Isthmus was held for two months at the
Finnish Main defense line, the so-called “Mannerheim
Line”. The Red Army gathered a massive
force, and launched a major offensive in
early February. By early March, the Red
Army was at the gates of Viipuri (Vyborg)
and had secured a foothold on the northern
shore of the Bay of Viipuri. Finland sued
for peace, which was signed on March 12th
1940.
The peace
terms were, from the Finnish point of view,
extremely hard. It came as a shock to the
Finnish leadership and the general public
that Finland would lose more in the peace
than was held by the Finnish Army. Finland
lost over 10 % of it’s territory (some
40 000 km²), 12 % of it’s population
(nearly 450 000 people) had to move out
from their homes. Finland lost it’s
third largest city Viipuri, an important
trading center and the most important port
of exportation for timber in addition to
an average of 10 - 17 % losses in other
branches of industry and economy. The Finnish
people couldn’t understand the Soviet
air attacks on the civilian targets, in
where 892 were killed and 1 856 wounded.
The Finnish military losses were 19 576
dead, 3 273 missing, 16 437 badly wounded
(some 10 000 were invalided), 27 120 slightly
wounded, totaling 66 406 people. The figure
doesn’t seem as a big one, but it
was 1,8 % of the Finnish population.
As the peace
terms were heavy, and the Soviet attack
was unjustified, the Finns were mostly
filled with bitterness and hatred towards
the Soviet Union. These feelings were strengthened
by additional demands, not included in
the peace treaty. The hunger for revenge
was not a rare thought those days.
2. The “Interim
peace”
Finland
had, before and during the Winter War,
hoped for foreign intervention by Western
powers. The League of Nations (the forefather
of the United Nations) had condemned the
Soviet attack and urged all member nations
to help Finland. Although a lot of noise
and promises were made (mainly by the French
and British governments), actual military
help was quite little. Sweden was the biggest
exception, and without her, Finland wouldn’t
have survived.
When the
war ended, Finland was in a bad political
situation. The Allied governments had suddenly
lost all interest in Finland. Sweden and
Norway were following a path of strict
neutrality. Unlike many would believe,
the Soviet threat hadn’t ended, even
though the Soviet Union proclaimed that “...Leningrad
was now safe and Finland had nothing to
be afraid of”. In fact, the political
bullying never ended. The plan of a Nordic
Defense Alliance (Finland, Norway, Sweden)
was born after the Moscow treaty, but publicly
abandoned on March 28th-29th when Molotov
(the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs)
informed that the Soviet Union would oppose
any plans of this kind.
After Germany
occupied Denmark and invaded Norway on
April 9th 1940, the tension in Scandinavia
increased. As Germany scored even more
victories in Belgium, Netherlands, and
France, and doing this with relatively
small casualties, it really worried the
Soviet Union. As a counter measure for
the increased German presence, Estonia,
Lithuania and Latvia were occupied between
June 15th and 17th, and the Baltic States
joined the Soviet Union on June 21st. These
actions worried the Finnish leadership.
These two giants seemed to do whatever
they pleased in Europe, especially the
Soviet Union was steadily taking back areas
that had been a part of the old Imperial
Russia.
Finland
had to seek support from somewhere. The
Allied powers were not a good choice as
France had fallen, the Soviet Union didn’t
allow any plans of a defensive alliance
between Finland and Sweden. Germany was
the only realistic country that possessed
any means to help Finland. The problem
was, that Germany and the Soviet Union
had a seemingly good relationship.
The really
big diplomatic problems began on June 23rd
1940, when Molotov expressed Soviet interest
in the Nickel mines in Petsamo. This left
Finland in a bad situation, as three major
powers were now interested about the Petsamo
Nickel (Britain, Germany and now the Soviet
Union). In late June, a trade agreement
was made between Finland and Germany. Finland
would sell to I.G.Farben 60 % of the Nickel
production. According to German estimations
that would be around 8 000 tons of nickel
in 1940 and 70 000 tons of nickel in 1941.
In addition Germany received in the first
year 14 000 tons of copper and in the next
year 11 000 of copper. The trade agreement
only increased Germany’s role to the
Finnish economy, Germany being the largest
buyer of Finnish exports. Finland expressed
it’s interests in buying war material
from Germany, but at that time, Germany
didn’t want to unnecessarily provoke
the Soviet Union by selling arms to Finland.
The whole
Spring and Summer of 1940 was a time of
uncertainty for Finland. Only in early
August (after Hitler had decided to launch
Barbarossa), did Germany’s attitude
towards Finland change. Finland was now
able to buy small (and later larger) shipments
of weapons from Germany, and slowly the
arms shipments to Finland, bought during
the Winter War and confiscated by Germany
in the Norwegian ports, were returned.
The biggest
leap in improving (and eventually chaining)
Finnish-German relationships was the Transit-agreement
(allowing Germany to send war material,
supplies and personnel to Norway through
northern Finland). While the matter was
actually agreed on August 19th, the agreement
was signed only after a somewhat similar
agreement with the Soviet Union (allowing
Soviet rail transports to the Hanko naval
base) was signed on September 6th. A political
agreement about the matter was made on
September 22nd, and it was informed to
the British, Swedish and Soviet governments.
The transit
agreement relieved some of the political
pressure by the Soviet Union. While the
tension (due to the squabble over the Petsamo
nickel production) was sometimes dangerously
close to war, the increased German presence
and influence in northern Norway and Finland
eased it a bit. Molotov arrived to Berlin
on November 12th 1940, invited by the German
Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von
Ribbentrop. In Berlin, Molotov met Adolph
Hitler many times in the following days.
In their negotiations, Molotov stated that
the secret agreement (included in the Non-Aggression
pact, where Germany and Soviet Union had “divided” the
countries between into “spheres of
interest”) had otherwise been fulfilled
except in Finland’s case. Hitler stated
that Germany didn’t have any other
interests in Finland, except as a source
of nickel and timber, but because these
products were vital for Germany’s
war industry, Germany wouldn’t allow
a new war in Finland. Molotov responded
that the Soviet Union wouldn’t want
to start a new war, instead the situation
could be handled like it had been done
with the Baltic States. Hitler opposed
also any plans of this type, “...as
they would increase tension between the
relationships of Germany and the Soviet
Union and thereby have far reaching consequences...”
This political
help by Hitler (most likely saved Finland
from a new war in late 1940), created a
political debt. This added to Germany’s
importance as a trade partner (grain, weapons
etc.) was narrowing Finland’s options
in the future.
2.1 The
Finnish Army
The Finnish
Army wasn’t totally demobilized after
the Winter War. As the new land border
with the Soviet Union was unfortified and
the global situation was uncertain, the
strength of the Finnish Defense Forces
never went below 109 000 men. Finland started
immediately to fortify the new border.
Plans were made to build a solid defense
line in south Finland and fortifying all
roads in central and northern Finland (the
Salpa-line, which was built between 1940
- 1944). The fortifying started immediately.
The Finnish arms industry didn’t decrease
it’s production during the interim
peace. New shipments of weapons were bought,
where ever available. The Finnish military
expenditure increased to 63,2 % of the
States annual expenditure in 1940 (the
estimated defense allocations were exceeded
by nearly 700 %). By Summer 1941, the Finnish
Army was a totally different force, in
terms of weaponry and equipment, than in
the Winter War. Finland mobilized 16 infantry
divisions, 2 Jaeger Brigades and 1 Cavalry
brigade. The strength of the Defense Forces
was 476 000 men.
2.2 The
Storm is nearing
On January
30th 1941, the Finnish Chief of General
Staff, General Heinrichs made a trip to
Germany, where he met the German counterpart
General Halder. It was in their discussions,
where the Finns first heard from a high
ranking person, about “...the possibility
of a German-Soviet war...”. Before
and after their meetings, many meetings
between officers were made, in where the
conversations were mostly about the Finnish
Army, it’s abilities, the terrain
and weather in Finland etc. The small hint
by Halder was the only piece of information
that the Finnish leadership had about “Barbarossa” until
May 1941. Rumors were spreading “the
Barbarossa being a scheme, intended to
cover a planned amphibious landing in Britain”, “...Germany
and the Soviet Union would soon negotiate...”, “...Germany
would soon attack the Soviet Union...”
On May 20th
Karl Schnurre, a special envoy of Hitler,
arrived in Helsinki and visited President
Risto Ryti (the former president K.Kallio
had resigned as his health was deteriorating,
and Prime Minister R.Ryti was elected as
President on December 12th 1940) immediately.
Schnurre did not mention “Barbarossa” directly,
instead he told that the threat of war
between Germany and the Soviet Union was
very much possible, but not sure. He wanted
to inform Finland, that in case the Soviet
Union would attack Finland, Germany would
help. He asked Ryti, that a Finnish officer
would be sent to Germany to discuss any
co-operation. Ryti discussed the matter
with Marshal Mannerheim, Prime Minister
Rangell, Minister of Foreign Affairs Witting
and the Defense Minister Walden. They all
agreed that Finland should accept the German
proposal. In practice, this meant that
after this, all military co-operation matters
were handled by Finnish Military Command.
On May 22nd, Schnurre sent Ribbentrop a
telegram where he reported that the negotiations
had been successful. After this, the plans
of co-operation started.
3. The Barbarossa
begins
While Finland
was initially regarded as an ally of Germany,
Finland hadn’t signed any pact, and
was (in it’s own opinion) fighting
on the German side against a mutual enemy.
In order to emphasize this point, Finland
didn’t start it’s attack on June
22nd 1941, when operation Barbarossa was
launched. Hitler in his speech claimed
that the Finns were fighting alongside
Germany, which created an awkward situation
for the Finnish political leadership (after
all, Finland couldn’t stay neutral
as Germany was using Finland as a base
for attacks). The situation was “rescued” when
on June 25th, the Red Air Force attacked
Finnish and German air bases in Finland.
This provided the reason for Finnish Prime
Minister to declare a state of war between
Finland and the Soviet Union. (The first
one to recognize Finland’s special
status as a co-fighter of Germany, being
the least dependent on Germany of all it’s
allies, was Stalin himself in Fall 1941.)
For the
majority of Finns, the Continuation War
was just as the name indicates “a
continuation to Winter War” where
Finland would take back the territories
it lost in an unprovoked war some 18 months
ago.
Sources:
“Suomi
Hyökkääjänä 1941”, by Helge Seppälä,
1984, Published by WSOY, Finland
“Talvisodan
Historia osa 4”, Institute of Military
Science, 1977 Published by WSOY, 1991,
Finland
"Suomi
75, Itsenäisen Suomen Historia" 3rd
edition, Published by Weilin + Göös, 1991,
Finland
“Suomi
Sodassa”, Valitut Palat (Reader’s
Digest), 1982, Finland
“Jatkosodan
Historia”, various writers, Institute
of Militry Science, Published by WSOY,
1990-94, Finland
Back
To Finnish Area |
Overview & Section Summaries
gunboards
